

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

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O 171815Z AUG 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4967
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 10589

STADIS////////////////////////////////

EXDIS DIST AS NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY, ATHERTON AND SAUNDERS ONLY

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PBOR, PEPR, EG, IS, US
SUBJECT: MORE THOUGHTS ON CAMP DAVID STRATEGY

REF: (1) STATE 207516, (B) TEL AVIV 10418

1. IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, "MORE FLEXIBILITY" ON SADAT'S PART
WOULD MEAN THAT HE AGREES TO THE FOLLOWING, (A) RESOLUTION OF
THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE WILL BE DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER THE FIVE YEAR
INTERIM PERIOD. (BUT BEGIN WOULD HAVE TO AGREE UNAMBIGUOUSLY
THAT IT WOULD THEN BE DECIDED.) IF SADAT INSISTS THAT BEGIN
RENOUNCE ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE WEST BANK NOW OR
IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, THE PARTY IS OVER WHILE BEGIN IS IN OFFICE.

(B) BORDER RECTIFICATION IF AND WHEN IT HAPPENS ON THE WEST
BANK, WILL BE MEASURED IN KILOMETERS AND NOT IN METERS. IN THE
PRINCIPLES, THIS MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS "LIMITED BORDER MODIFI-
CATIONS" TO BE AGREED UPON AT THE END OF THE INTERIM PERIOD,

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ALTHOUGH I PREFER SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING: "THE PRINCIPLE
OF WITHDRAWAL CANNOT BE APPLIED SELECTIVELY; WITHDRAWAL, WHICH
SHALL TAKE PLACE ON ALL FRONTS OF THE CONFLICT, SHOULD BE TO
MUTUALLY AGREED AND SECURE BOUNDARIES." THE ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY
CALL THIS CONCEPT TERRITORIAL COMPROMISE. SADAT COULD CALL IT
"MINOR MODIFICATIONS." WHATEVER ITS NAME, DOZENS OF SQUARE
KILOMETERS WOULD EVENTUALLY HAVE TO GO INTO ISRAELI HANDS IN A

FINAL SETTLEMENT. IF SADAT REQUIRES IMMEDIATE COMMITMENT TO NEAR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL, WE WILL FACE AN ABSOLUTE IMPASSE. THE PROBLEM WITH USING LANGUAGE LIKE "WITHDRAWAL SHALL TAKE PLACE ON ALL FRONTS OF THE CONFLICT" IS OF COURSE THAT BEGIN MAY EVENTUALLY AGREE TO THE FORMULATION, THEN SAY PUBLICLY THT HIS AUTONOMY PLAN FULFILLS ISRAEL'S WEST BANK OBLIGATION IN THIS RESPECT.

(C) ISRAEL WILL BE ALLOWED SOME AGREED FORM OF SECURITY PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK BEYOND THE INTERIM PERIOD. LANGUAGE SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING MIGHT WORK: "THERE SHOULD BE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES AS APPROPRIATE, AND ISRAELI SECURITY MEASURES IN THESE AREAS AS DEFINED AND AGREED IN NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE PARTIES."

(D) IF HUSSEIN REFUSES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, THEN SADAT WILL NEGOTIATE AND CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT RELATING TO THOSE AREAS, WHETHER IT IS A FULL PEACE TREATY OR SOMETHING LESS TO GIVE SOME INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY TO THE INTERIM REGIME.

2. IF SADAT CLEARLY AND PUBLICLY AGREED TO (B) AND (C) ABOVE, BUT COULD NOT BUY BEGIN'S POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY, AND THUS THE CAMP DAVID TALKS FAILED, MODERATE OPINION IN ISRAEL WOULD HAVE A FLAG TO RALLY AROUND. SADAT WOULD HAVE SHOWED HE WAS WILLING TO MEET ISRAEL'S FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS, AS DEFINED BY MOST ISRAELIS. ONLY BEGIN STOOD IN THE WAY.

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3. TO PUT IT MILDLY, THIS IS A GREAT DEAL FOR SADAT TO SWALLOW. WHAT DOES HE GET FOR IT? SINAI. BUT HE ALSO MUST RECEIVE SOMETHING FROM THE ISRAELIS ON THE OTHER OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. THAT MUST MEAN INITIALLY AND END TO GOI POLITICAL PRESENCE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, AND A VISIBLE REDUCTION IN THE IDF MILITARY PRESENCE. WE WILL RUN INTO HEAVY SEMANTIC TROUBLES WITH BEGIN ON "THE END OF OCCUPATION" LANGUAGE, BUT DAYAN ONCE SEEMED MILDLY INTERESTED IN SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING: "UPON INSTALLATION OF THE ELECTED LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABOLISHED AND ISRAELI RULE OVER THOSE TERRITORIES WILL END." THE SUBSTANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THE END OF "OCCUPATION" OR "RULE" NEED BE NO DIFFERENT. THE IDEA IS, AS DAYAN CONTINUES SAYING, TO GET THE ISRAELIS OUT OF THE LIVES OF THE ARABS ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA.

4. THE END OF ISRAELI RULE COULD ENTAIL MANY OF THE ELEMENTS WE HAVE BEEN THINKING ABOUT IN OUR INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS THESE PAST MONTHS. A TRANSITIONAL REGIME DERIVING ITS AUTHORITY FROM AGREEMENT AMONG THE PARTIES, OR LESS IDEALY FROM THE MILITARY GOVERNOR AS WELL, WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE IDF

COULD BE WITHDRAWN TO DESIGNATED AREAS IN DESIGNATED NUMBERS.
A FREELY ELECTED GOVERNING BODY WOULD ADMINISTER THE TERRITORIES.
PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY WOULD BE THE JOB OF THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES
EXCEPT WHEN ISRAEL'S SECURITY WAS THREATENED. JORDAN ON THE WEST
BANK AND EGYPT IN GAZA COULD HAVE A SPECIAL ROLE DURING THE
TRANSITION PERIOD. I DO NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTIES IN
GETTING BEGIN TO AGREE TO THESE CONCEPTS, BUT HE HAS CEASELESSLY
REPEATED THAT HIS AUTONOMY PLAN IS OPEN TO NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD
BE IN SADAT'S INTEREST, AND IN OURS, IF BEGIN'S HAND WERE CALLED.

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 TEL AVIV 10589

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EXDIS DIST AS NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY, ATHERTON AND SAUNDERS ONLY

FROM AMBASSADOR

5. SADAT MIGHT ALSO GET A PRINCIPLE ON SETTLEMENTS
ALTHOUGH THAT WOULD BE POLITICALLY VERY DIFFICULT FOR
BEGIN. BUT WE MIGHT TRY SOMETHING LIKE THE FOLLOWING:
"AS LONG AS DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE ACTIVELY UNDERWAY,"
OR LATERTERNATIVELY "DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD," "THERE
SHOULD BE NO ISRAELI ACTIVITY TO CREATE NEW SETTLEMENTS
ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA OR TO EXPAND EXISTING ONES
IN WAYS WHICH ALTER THE CHARACTER OF THE TERRITORIES."
THAT LAST PHRASE WOULD TAKE A PARTICULARLY HARD SELL
BY U.S. IN THE MOST IDEAL NEGOTIATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
ANOTHER POSSIBILITY ON SETTLEMENTS WOULD BE AN ISRAELI
COMMITMENT THAT NO GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF SETTLEMENTS
WOULD TAKE PLACE DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD, BUT THAT
ISRAELI INDIVIDUALS WOULD BE ABLE TO PURCHASE PRIVATE
PROPERTY ON THE WEST BANK.

6. WE MIGHT ALSO GET BEGIN TO AGREE TO THE ASWAN
LANGUAGE THAT "THERE MUST BE A RESOLUTION OF THE PALES-
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TINIAN PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS." THE ISRAELIS OF
COUSE HAVE RESISTED THAT FORMULATION IN THE PAST, BUT
DAYAN TWICE IN YOUR LARGE MEETING WITH BEGIN AUGUST 6
USED NEARLY THIS EXACT PHRASEOLOGY OF THE ASWAN DECLARATION
INCLUDING THE WORDS "IN ALL ITS ASPECTS." "LEGITIMATE
RIGHTS" WILL BE MUCH TOUGHER WITH THE ISRAELIS. PERHAPS
WE CANNOT STEP BACK FROM ASWAN LANGUAGE, BUT WHAT ABOUT
"RECOGNIZING THE LEGITIMATE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DETERMINATION OF THEIR OWN
FUTURE." EVEN THOUGH "RIGHTS" HAVE BECOME "RIGHT,"
RESOLVING THE PROBLEM IN "ALL ITS ASPECTS" MIGHT BE
SUFFICIENTLY COMPREHENSIVE.

7. WITH RESPECT TO SINAI, WHILE THE AIRFILDS AND THE
SETTLEMENTS REMAIN A PROBLEM, IT IS MY IMPRESSION THAT
THERE IS A DEAL TO BE HAD IF SADAT CAN BE SATISFIED
ON THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA. HOWEVER, HE WOULD HAVE
TO ALLOW ONE OR BOTH OF THE AIRFIELDS TO REMAIN IN
ISRAELI HANDS LONGER THAN THE TWO YEARS HE HAS PREVIOUSLY
MENTIONED, AND ACCEPT SOME ARRANGEMENT THROUGH WHICH
THE ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS (SETTLERS?) COULD STAY IN
PLACE FOR SEVERAL YEARS, PERPAHS GUARDED BY A UN OR JOINT
ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN POLICE FORCE.

8. TO REPEAT ONE CENTRAL POINT IN TEL AVIV'S 10418,
THE OVERRIDING QUESTION SADAT MUST ANSWER IS WHETHER HE
WILL REACH CONCRETE AGREEMENTS, AT LEAST ON SINAI, IF
BEGIN SWALLOWS HARD ON LANGUAGE FOR A DECLARATION OF
PRINCIPLES, WITHOUG GIVING HUSSEIN OR HUSSEIN/ASSAD
AN EFFECTIVE VETO. THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE OF MOVING
BEGIN OR DAYAN ON PRINCIPLES UNLESS SADAT REASSURES
THEM CONVINCINGLY ON THIS POINT.

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9. WHAT IS HURRIEDLY SKETCHED OUT ABOVE HAS THE TWO
PURPOSES MENTIONED IN MY EARLIER MESSAGE. IF SADAT CAN
AGREE, IT PUTS BEGIN AGAINST A CLEAR CHOICE WHICH HE
CANNOT EVADE. AND IF BEGIN FAILS THE TEST, HE WOULD
RETURN TO AN ISRAEL WAITING TO SIT IN JUDGMENT ON A
LEADER WHO LOOKED BACKWARD INSTEAD OF FORWARD AT

A HISTORIC MOMENT IN THISNATION'S HISTORY, A LEADER WHO
MISSED ISRAEL'S CHANCE FOR PEACE WITH EGYPT. LEWIS

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